In metaphysics, impenetrability is the name given to that quality of matter whereby two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time. The philosopher John Toland argued that impenetrability and extension were sufficient to define matter, a contention strongly disputed by Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz.
Locke considered impenetrability to be "more a consequence of solidity, than solidity itself."1
Notes
Notes
- Locke, John. IV An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oregon State University.
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References
References
- This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Wood, James, ed. (1907). The Nuttall Encyclopædia. London and New York: Frederick Warne.
{{cite encyclopedia}}: Missing or empty|title=(help) - Heinemann, F. H. "Toland and Leibniz." The Philosophical Review, Vol. 54, No. 5. (September, 1945), pp. 437–457.