Article · Wikipedia archive · Last revised Jul 16, 2026

Draft:Radical right

Last revised
Jul 16, 2026
Read time
≈ 11 min
Length
2,482 w
Citations
48
Source

In the politics of the United States, the radical right is a political preference that leans towards ultraconservatism, white nationalism, white supremacy, or other far-right ideologies in a hierarchical structure which is paired with conspiratorial rhetoric alongside traditionalist and reactionary aspirations.1234 The term was first used by social scientists in the 1950s regarding small groups such as the John Birch Society in the United States, and since then it has been applied to similar groups worldwide.5 The term "radical" was applied to the groups because they sought to make fundamental (hence "radical") changes within institutions and remove persons and institutions that threatened their values or economic interests from political life.6

In political science, the terms radical right, populist right, and populist radical right, have been used to refer to the range of nationalist, right-wing and far-right political parties that have grown in support in Europe since the late 1970s. Populist right groups have shared a number of causes, which typically include opposition to globalisation and immigration, criticism of multiculturalism, and opposition to the European Union,7 with some opposing liberal democracy or rejecting democracy altogether in favor of "Illiberal democracy" or outright authoritarian dictatorship.8910111213

The ideological spectrum of the radical right extends from staunchly right-wing national conservatism and right-wing populism to far-right Third Positionism and other neo-fascist ideologies.141516

Terminology

In the United States

There has been disagreement among academics and social scientists over how the right-wing political movement should be described. No consensus on the proper terminology exists, although the terminology developed in the 1950s—based on the use of the words "radical" or "extremist"—is the most commonly used. Other scholars simply prefer to call them "The Right" or "conservatives," which is what they call themselves. The terminology is used to describe a broad range of movements.17 The term "radical right" was coined by Seymour Martin Lipset. It was included in a book titled The New American Right (1955).18 The contributors to that book identified a conservative "responsible Right" as represented by the Republican administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower and a radical right that wished to change political and social life.19 Further to the right of the radical right, they identified themselves as the "ultra-right", adherents of which advocated drastic change, but would only use violence against the state in extreme cases. In the decades since, the ultra-right, while adopting the basic ideology of the 1950s radical right,20 has updated it to encompass what it sees as threats posed by the modern world. It has leveraged fear of those threats to draw new adherents and encourage support of a more militant approach to countering these perceived threats. A book written by Klaus Wah in the year 2000, The Radical Right, contrasts the radical right of the 1950s, which obtained influence during the Reagan administration, to the radical right of today, which has increasingly turned to violent acts beginning with the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995.212223

Wahl's book documents this evolution: "Ideologies of [today's] radical right emphasize social and economic threats in the modern and postmodern world (e.g., globalization, immigration). The radical right also promises protection against such threats by an emphatic ethnic construction of 'we', the people, as a familiar, homogeneous in-group, anti-modern, or reactionary structures of family, society, an authoritarian state, nationalism, the discrimination, or exclusion of immigrants and other minorities ... While favoring traditional social and cultural structures (traditional family and gender roles, religion, etc.) the radical right uses modern technologies and it does not ascribe to a specific economic policy; some parties advocate a liberal, free-market policy, but other parties advocate a welfare state policy. Finally, the radical right can be scaled by using different degrees of militancy and aggressiveness from right-wing populism to racism, terrorism, and totalitarianism."24

Ultra-right groups, as The Radical Right definition states, are normally called "far-right" groups,25 but they may also be called "radical right" groups.26 According to Clive Webb, "Radical right is commonly, but not exclusively used to describe anticommunist organizations such as the Christian Crusade and the John Birch Society... [T]he term far right ... is the label most broadly used by scholars ... to describe militant white supremacists."27

In Europe

The Friedrich Ebert Foundation, in a 2011 book, defines the terms "right-wing extremist" and "right-wing populist" differently.28

In 1996, the Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde noted that in most European countries, the terms "radical right" and "extreme right" were used interchangeably.29 He cited Germany as an exception, noting that among political scientists in that nation, the term "radical right" (Rechsradikalismus) was used in reference to those right-wing groups which were outside the political mainstream but which did not threaten "the free democratic order"; the term was thus used in contrast to the "extreme right" (Rechsextremen), which referred to groups which did threaten the constitutionality of the state and could therefore be banned under German law.30 According to the German scientist Klaus Wahl "the radical right can be scaled by using different degrees of militancy and aggressiveness from right-wing populism to racism, terrorism, and totalitarianism".31

The term "radical right" originated in U.S. political discourse, where it was applied to various anti-communist groups which were active in the 1950s era of McCarthyism.32 The term and accompanying concept then entered Western Europe through the social sciences.32 Conversely, the term "right-wing extremism" developed among European scholars, particularly those in Germany, to describe right-wing groups that developed in the decades following the Second World War, such as the West German National Democratic Party and the French Poujadists.33 This term then came to be adopted by some scholars in the U.S.34

Defining Europe's populist right

"The rise of new parties on the right in the 1980s led to a great deal of controversy over how these parties are defined. Some authors argue that these parties share essential characteristics, while others point to the unique national features and circumstances of each party. Some see them as throwbacks to the fascist era, while others see them as mixing right-wing, liberal, and populist platforms to broaden their electoral appeal. The party ideologues themselves have argued that they cannot be placed on the left-to-right spectrum."

— Terri E. Givens, 2005.35

In his study of the movement in Europe, David Art defined the term "radical right" as referring to "a specific type of far right party that began to emerge in the late 1970s"; as Art used it, "far right" was "an umbrella term for any political party, voluntary association, or extra-parliamentary movement that differentiates itself from the mainstream right".36 Most commentators have agreed that these varied radical right parties have a number of common characteristics.37 Givens stated that the two characteristics shared by these radical rights groups were:

  • "They take an anti-immigrant stance by proposing stronger immigrant controls and the repatriation of unemployed immigrants, and they call for a national (i.e., citizens only) preference in social benefits and employment ('welfare chauvinism').
  • "In contrast to earlier extreme right or fascist parties, they work within a country's political and electoral system. Although they do not have the goal of tearing down the current political system, they are anti-establishment. They consider themselves "outsiders" in the party system, and therefore not tainted by government or mainstream parties' scandals."37

In 2000, Minkenberg characterised the "radical right" as "a political ideology, the core element of which is a myth of a homogeneous nation, a romantic and populist ultranationalism which is directed against the concept of liberal and pluralistic democracy and its underlying principles of individualism and universalism. The contemporary radical right does not want to return to pre-democratic regimes such as monarchy or feudalism. It wants government by the people, but in terms of ethnocracy instead of democracy."38 In 2020, Wahl summarized that "ideologies of the radical right emphasize social and economic threats in the modern and postmodern world (e.g., globalization, immigration). The radical right also promises protection against such threats by an emphatic ethnic construction of 'we', the people, as a familiar, homogeneous in-group, anti-modern, or reactionary structures of family, society, an authoritarian state, nationalism, the discrimination, or exclusion of immigrants and other minorities ... While favoring traditional social and cultural structures (traditional family and gender roles, religion, etc.) the radical right uses modern technologies and does not ascribe to a specific economic policy; some parties tend toward a liberal, free-market policy, and others more to a welfare state policy."31

Journalist Nick Robins-Early characterised the European radical right as focusing on "sometimes vitriolic anti-Euro, anti-immigrant sentiment, as well as renewed security fears" within European nations.39 According to political scientist Andrej Zaslove, populist radical right parties "employ an anti‐state, anti‐bureaucratic, anti‐elite, anti‐European Union political message."40

Base of support

The 2005 paper in the European Journal of Political Research argues that the two groups most likely to vote for populist right parties are "blue-collar workers – who support extensive state intervention in the economy – and owners of small businesses – who are against such state intervention".41

A 2014 article by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation argued that economic inequality is growing the gap "between the winners of globalisation and its losers. The first group live in urban areas, have relatively stable jobs and access to modern communications and transport, but fears nevertheless that it will soon share the fate of the second group. The second group, meanwhile, are threatened by unemployment or stuck in poorly paid and precarious jobs. They belong to the working class or consider themselves part of the lower middle class and fear – for themselves or their children – (further) social decline. Such people live in de-industrialised areas, or rural or semi-urban areas, on the periphery of globalised metropolises to which they have no access."42

Scholars have argued that neoliberalism has led to European "social and economic insecurity" in the working and middle classes, leading to the growth of right wing populism.43

Minkenberg termed the supporters of the radical right "modernization losers", in that they are from the sectors of society whose "social and cultural capital is shrinking and they are intent on defending it against encroachments on their traditional entitlements."44 He described this base as those who exhibit "unease, rigid thinking, authoritarian attitudes and traditional values – all of which reinforce each other."45

References

References

  1. Potok, Mark (2004). "The American radical right: the 1990s and beyond". In Eatwell, Roger; Mudde, Cas (eds.). Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge. Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy (1st ed.). New York and London: Routledge. pp. 41–61. ISBN 9780415553872. LCCN 2003010829.
  2. Durham, Martin (2000). "The rise of the right". The Christian Right, the Far Right, and the Boundaries of American Conservatism. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press. pp. 1–23. ISBN 9780719054860.
  3. Gannon, Thomas M. (July–September 1981). "The New Christian Right in America as a Social and Political Force". Archives de sciences sociales des religions. 26 (52–1). Paris: Éditions de l'EHESS: 69–83. doi:10.3406/assr.1981.2226. ISSN 0335-5985. JSTOR 30125411.
  4. Davis, David Brion, ed. (1971). The Fear of Conspiracy: Images of Un-American Subversion from the Revolution to the present. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. pp. xv–xix. ISBN 9780801405983. OCLC 128472.
  5. Diamond, pp. 5–6
  6. Zaslove, Andrej (2004-03-01). "The Dark Side of European Politics: Unmasking the Radical Right". Journal of European Integration. 26 (1): 61–81. doi:10.1080/0703633042000197799. ISSN 0703-6337. S2CID 143702243.
  7. Hillebrand, Ernst (May 2014). "Right Wing Populism in Europe – How do we Respond?" (PDF). Friedrich Ebert Foundation.
  8. Zaslove, Andrej (2004-03-01). "The Dark Side of European Politics: Unmasking the Radical Right". Journal of European Integration. 26 (1): 61–81. doi:10.1080/0703633042000197799. ISSN 0703-6337. S2CID 143702243.
  9. "The Global Resurgence of Populism as a Social Movement: Unifying the People or Creating Social Cleavages - the Yale Review of International Studies". 19 October 2018.
  10. John Mering, "The Constitutional Union Campaign of 1860: An Example of the Paranoid Style," Mid America, 1978, Vol. 60#2 pp. 95–106
  11. "Illiberal Democracy and the Struggle on the Right". Journal of Democracy. Retrieved 2024-07-31.
  12. "The populist challenge to liberal democracy". Brookings. Retrieved 2024-07-31.
  13. Golder, Matt (2016). "Far Right Parties in Europe". Annual Review of Political Science. 19: 477–497. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-042814-012441.
  14. Bar-On 2018, p. 24. sfn error: no target: CITEREFBar-On2018 (help)
  15. Minkenberg 2011, p. 46. sfn error: no target: CITEREFMinkenberg2011 (help)
  16. "The national conservatism movement just began—does it have a future?". The Daily Dot. 11 August 2019.
  17. Diamond, pp. 5–6
  18. Plotke, p. lxxvii
  19. Plotke, pp. xxvi–xxvii
  20. Plotke, pp. xxxix–xl
  21. Potok, Mark (2004). "The American radical right: the 1990s and beyond". In Eatwell, Roger; Mudde, Cas (eds.). Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge. Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy (1st ed.). New York and London: Routledge. pp. 41–61. ISBN 9780415553872. LCCN 2003010829.
  22. Durham, Martin (2000). "The rise of the right". The Christian Right, the Far Right, and the Boundaries of American Conservatism. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press. pp. 1–23. ISBN 9780719054860.
  23. Plotke, pp. xi–xii
  24. Wahl, Klaus (2020). The Radical Right. Biopsychosocial Roots and International Variations. London: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 14. ISBN 978-3-030-25130-7. OCLC 1126278982.
  25. Davies & Lynch, p. 5
  26. Davies & Lynch, p. 335
  27. Webb, p. 10
  28. Nora Langenbacher; Britta Schellenberg [in German]; Karen Margolis, eds. (2011). Is Europe on the "Right" Path? Right-wing extremism and right-wing populism in Europe (PDF). Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Forum Berlin Project "Combating Right-Wing Extremism". ISBN 978-3-86872-617-6.
  29. Mudde 1996, p. 230. sfn error: no target: CITEREFMudde1996 (help)
  30. Mudde 1996, pp. 230–231. sfn error: no target: CITEREFMudde1996 (help)
  31. Wahl, Klaus [in German] (2020). The Radical Right. Biopsychosocial Roots and International Variations. London: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 14. ISBN 978-3-030-25130-7. OCLC 1126278982.
  32. Kaplan & Weinberg 1998, p. 10. sfn error: no target: CITEREFKaplanWeinberg1998 (help)
  33. Kaplan & Weinberg 1998, pp. 10–11. sfn error: no target: CITEREFKaplanWeinberg1998 (help)
  34. Kaplan & Weinberg 1998, p. 11. sfn error: no target: CITEREFKaplanWeinberg1998 (help)
  35. Givens 2005, p. 18. sfn error: no target: CITEREFGivens2005 (help)
  36. Art 2011, p. 10. sfn error: no target: CITEREFArt2011 (help)
  37. Givens 2005, p. 20. sfn error: no target: CITEREFGivens2005 (help)
  38. Minkenberg 2000, pp. 174–175. sfn error: no target: CITEREFMinkenberg2000 (help)
  39. Robins-Early 2015. sfn error: no target: CITEREFRobins-Early2015 (help)
  40. Zaslove, Andrej (2004-03-01). "The Dark Side of European Politics: Unmasking the Radical Right". Journal of European Integration. 26 (1): 61–81. doi:10.1080/0703633042000197799. ISSN 0703-6337. S2CID 143702243.
  41. Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth [in Norwegian] (2005). "The vulnerable populist right parties: No economic realignment fuelling their electoral success". European Journal of Political Research. 44 (3): 465–492. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00235.x. ISSN 0304-4130.
  42. Hillebrand, Ernst (May 2014). "Right Wing Populism in Europe – How do we Respond?" (PDF). Friedrich Ebert Foundation.
  43. "Changes in working life and the appeal of right-wing populism in Europe" (PDF). Forschungs- und Beratungsstelle Arbeitswelt. 17–18 June 2004. Archived from the original (PDF) on 13 April 2016. Retrieved 25 June 2016.
  44. Minkenberg 2000, pp. 182–183. sfn error: no target: CITEREFMinkenberg2000 (help)
  45. Minkenberg 2000, p. 183. sfn error: no target: CITEREFMinkenberg2000 (help)