Open Yale Courses
ECON 159: Game Theory
Mirrored from oyc.yale.edu · CC-BY-NC-SA-3.0 · Ben Polak Professor of Economics and Management
Mirrored from: oyc.yale.edu · Yale University · Economics
Instructor: Ben Polak Professor of Economics and Management · License: CC-BY-NC-SA-3.0

About this course
This course is an introduction to game theory and strategic thinking. Ideas such as dominance, backward induction, Nash equilibrium, evolutionary stability, commitment, credibility, asymmetric information, adverse selection, and signaling are discussed and applied to games played in class and to examples drawn from economics, politics, the movies, and elsewhere.
Course details
Course Structure
This Yale College course, taught on campus twice per week for 75 minutes, was recorded for Open Yale Courses in Fall 2007.
Texts
A. Dixit and B. Nalebuff. Thinking Strategically , Norton 1991
J. Watson. Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory , Norton 2002
P.K. Dutta. Strategies and Games: Theory And Practice , MIT 1999
Requirements
Who should take this course? This course is an introduction to game theory. Introductory microeconomics (115 or equivalent) is required. Intermediate micro (150/2) is not required, but it is recommended. We will use calculus (mostly one variable) in this course. We will also refer to ideas like probability and expectation. Some may prefer to take the course next academic year once they have more background. Students who have already taken Econ 156b should not enroll in this class.
Course Aims and Methods. Game theory is a way of thinking about strategic situations. One aim of the course is to teach you some strategic considerations to take into account making your choices. A second aim is to predict how other people or organizations behave when they are in strategic settings. We will see that these aims are closely related. We will learn new concepts, methods and terminology. A third aim is to apply these tools to settings from economics and from elsewhere. The course will emphasize examples. We will also play several games in class.
Outline and Reading. Most of the reading for this course comes from the first ten chapters of Dutta or from the first two parts of Watson. There will be a reading packet for weeks 6-7. The readings are not compulsory, but they will help back up the class material.
Grading
Problem sets: 30% Midterm examination: 30% Final examination: 40%
Syllabus
1 section · 26 lectures · links open at oyc.yale.edu.
Course sessions
- Introduction: Five First Lessons
- Putting Yourselves into Other People's Shoes
- Iterative Deletion and the Median-Voter Theorem
- Best Responses in Soccer and Business Partnerships
- Nash Equilibrium: Bad Fashion and Bank Runs
- Nash Equilibrium: Dating and Cournot
- Nash Equilibrium: Shopping, Standing and Voting on a Line
- Nash Equilibrium: Location, Segregation and Randomization
- Mixed Strategies in Theory and Tennis
- Mixed Strategies in Baseball, Dating and Paying Your Taxes
- Evolutionary Stability: Cooperation, Mutation, and Equilibrium
- Evolutionary Stability: Social Convention, Aggression, and Cycles
- Midterm Exam
- Sequential Games: Moral Hazard, Incentives, and Hungry Lions
- Backward Induction: Commitment, Spies, and First-Mover Advantages
- Backward Induction: Chess, Strategies, and Credible Threats
- Backward Induction: Reputation and Duels
- Backward Induction: Ultimatums and Bargaining
- Imperfect Information: Information Sets and Sub-Game Perfection
- Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Matchmaking and Strategic Investments
- Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Wars of Attrition
- Repeated Games: Cooperation vs. the End Game
- Repeated Games: Cheating, Punishment, and Outsourcing
- Asymmetric Information: Silence, Signaling and Suffering Education
- Asymmetric Information: Auctions and the Winner's Curse
- Final Exam